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CASENOTES

WITHROW V. WILLIAMS AND COLLATERAL REVIEW OF
MIRANDA VIOLATIONS: THE SUPREME COURT REJECTS
THE RULE OF STONE V. POWELL UNDER A REVISED
VIEW OF APPLICABLE PRUDENTIAL CONCERNS

I. INTRODUCTION
More than fifty years before ratification of the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments to the Constitution, Lord Camden observed:
[It is very certain, that the law obligeth no man to accuse
himself; because the necessary means of compelling selfaccusation, falling upon the innocent as well as the guilty,
would be both cruel and unjust; and it should seem, that
search for evidence is disallowed upon the same principle.
There, too, the innocent would be confounded with the
guilty.'
Over one hundred years later, in Mapp v. Ohio,2 the Supreme
Court affirmed this relationship between Fourth and Fifth
Amendment liberties, holding that the doctrines of those
amendments "apply to all invasions on the part of the government and its employees of the sanctity of a man's home and
the privacies of life."3

1. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 646 (1961) (quoting Entick v. Carrington, 19
Howel's State Trials 1029, 1073 (1765)).
2. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
3. Id. at 646 (quoting Boyd v. U.S., 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)).
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Specifically, the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment protects criminal defendants from the use at trial of their
own incriminating statements obtained through governmental
coercion.4 Similarly, the Fourth Amendment's protection against
unlawful searches and seizures constitutes an exclusionary
safeguard, prohibiting the use of physical evidence obtained in
violation of a defendant's Fourth Amendment privacy rights.'
Nevertheless, soon after its decision in Mapp, the Court began
to recognize specific, carefully defined limitations on the reach
of protection afforded by these liberties.6 Among them, the
scope of a defendant's redress for infringement of his Fourth
and Fifth Amendment rights, especially on collateral review,
has not been entirely clear. In Stone v. Powell,' a majority of
the Court held that where a State has provided an opportunity
for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a
state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief
on the ground that evidence introduced at his trial was obtained through an unconstitutional search and seizure.' Until

4. The Fifth Amendment provides: "No person ... shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself ...
" U.S. CONST. amend V. The privilege against self-incrimination is applicable against federal and state governmental
actions. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964) (incorporating the Fifth Amendment's
self-incrimination clause into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
It is a personal right "applying only to natural individuals." United States v. White,
322 U.S. 694, 698 (1944). It also requires exclusion of coerced testimony absent constitutionally mandated safeguards. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). See
also Edson R. Sunderland, Self-Incrimination and Constitutional Principle: Miranda v.
Arizona and Beyond, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 171, 173-88 (1979).
5. The Fourth Amendment provides: "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The prohibition on illegal
searches and seizures applies both to federal and state officials. See Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383, 391-92 (1914); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 33 (1949) (holding
that the Federal Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures by state
officers). The Fourth Amendment, though not referring to or limiting the use of evidence in court, forbids the introduction of evidence, if obtained through a violation of
the amendment in federal courts. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 462
(1928). The same applies to state courts. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
6. See United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976) (holding that the exclusionary
rule does not apply to a civil tax proceeding in the Fourth Amendment context);
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (holding that the exclusionary rule
does not apply to a grand jury proceeding in the Fourth Amendment context).
7. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
8. Id. at 466.
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its recent decision in Withrow v. Williams,' however, the Court
had not directly addressed the question of whether similar limitations apply to federal habeas corpus relief sought by state
prisoners on Fifth Amendment grounds. In Withrow, the Court
held that Stone's restriction on the exercise of federal habeas
jurisdiction does not extend to a state prisoner's claim that his
conviction rests on statements obtained in violation of Fifth
Amendment safeguards. ° The Court identified a number of
reasons for this divergent treatment of Fourth and Fifth
Amendment protections. Primarily, Withrow examined the nature and operation of a defendant's Fifth Amendment privileges,
and the relationship between these liberties and fundamental
concepts of federalism and judicial finality." This Note provides an analysis of the holding in Withrow, with particular
emphasis on the Court's reasoning in these areas. Also addressed is the vital question Withrow leaves in its wake, namely, whether the distinction it draws between the Fourth and
Fifth Amendment exclusionary rules is a clear and consistent
one, and the extent to which the decision signals a change of
direction with respect to Stone and federal habeas corpus relief.
Part H of this Note provides an overview and history of
Miranda and Fifth Amendment safeguards, in contrast to those
of the Fourth Amendment. Part III provides a summary of the
facts and procedural posture of Withrow, and Parts IV and V

9. 113 S. Ct. 1745 (1993).
10. Id. (holding that the Stone rule was not jurisdictional but prudential in nature
and counselling against application of the Mapp Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule
on collateral review).
11. The Court identifies these principles as: "(i) the most effective utilization of
limited judicial resources, (ii) the necessity of finality in criminal trials, (iii) the
minimization of friction between our federal and state systems of criminal justice, and
(iv) the maintenance of the constitutional balance upon which the doctrine of federalism is founded." Withrow, 113 S. Ct. at 1750 (quoting Stone, 428 U.S. at 491). These
same concepts, in one form or another, have surfaced in prior cases. See, e.g., Garner
v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 655 (1976) ("the fundamental purpose of the Fifth
Amendment [is] the preservation of an adversary system of criminal justice"); Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961) (holding that the "imperative of judicial integrity"
must be considered when deciding whether to grant habeas relief for violations of the
Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule); Stone, 428 U.S. at 479 (stating that Fourth
Amendment violations are different in kind from denials of Fifth or Sixth Amendment
rights in that they do not "challenge evidence as inherently unreliable"). For a more
extensive discussion of these principles, see Erwin Chemerinsky, Thinking About Habeas Corpus, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 748, 761-75 (1987).
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address the Court's analysis in Withrow and its implications for
the future of federal habeas jurisdiction in these areas.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF CASE LAW INTERPRETING AND APPLYING
THE SELF-INCRIMINATION CLAUSE OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT

A. The MirandaRule
In the thirty years between 1936, when the Supreme Court
first addressed the issue in Brown v. Mississippi,' and its
landmark Miranda decision in 1966, s the constitutionality of

criminal testimony at the state level was governed not by the
Fifth Amendment but by the concept of "fundamental fairness"
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 4
This analysis was one which the Court had used on a broader
level to justify general interference with state court procedures." In Brown, however, the Court expounded upon the
"fundamental fairness" doctrine by developing a "coerced confession" test whereby incriminating testimony obtained through
police tactics that were "revolting to the sense of justice" was
excluded at trial. 6 As applied, the test required examination

12. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
13. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
14. Brown, 297 U.S. at 286-87 (quoting Herbert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316
(1926)) (stating that the measure of constitutionality was whether government conduct
violated "fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our
civil and political institutions"). See also, Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 567 (1958)
(characterizing the applicable question to be whether tactics used by the government
deprived a claimant of "that fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of
justice").
15. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934) (stating that federal interference in state court procedure is justified where state action offends some principle
"so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental").
16. Brown, 297 U.S. at 286. Brown involved homicide convictions based largely on
confessions obtained by whipping the defendants. The majority wrote: "Ilt would be
difficult to conceive of methods more revolting to the sense of justice than those taken to procure the confessions of these petitioners, and the use of the confessions thus
obtained as the basis for conviction and sentence was a clear denial of due process."
Id. This "shock the conscience" standard was first conceived as an objective test.
Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 154 (1944). Later, the Court considered a
defendant's subjective strength of will in determining whether testimony was in fact
coerced. Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 197-98 (1957). Finally, the "totality of the
circumstances" requirement included an examination of both the behavior of the police
and the characteristics of the confessor. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 514
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of all the circumstances under which a confession was obtained,
both the objective physical environment and the subjective characteristics of the defendant and his inquisitor, in order to determine if the tactics used overpowered the defendant's free will
and thus violated his due process rights.'7 Doubting the reliability of coerced testimony, the Court also came to view the
test as a means of ensuring the accuracy of evidence presented
at trial. 8 Over time, the rationale behind the coercion test was
enlarged to include concepts of preservation of the American
accusatorial justice system and deterrence of oppressive police
tactics. 9
Nevertheless, it gradually became apparent to the Court that
the "coerced confession" doctrine was counterproductive to judicial review. Not only did the "totality of the circumstances"
case-by-case approach lead to inconsistent results among jurisdictions," but by failing to articulate a precise standard of review, the rule left judges free to base decisions on their subjective evaluations of whether a confession was "voluntary." Although it originally addressed these shortcomings via the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel in criminal proceedings, 2 ' the
(1963).
17. Haynes, 373 U.S. at 514.
18. See, e.g., Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596 (1944); Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547
(1942).
19. See, e.g., Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 540-41 (1961).
20. As Justice Clark wrote in criticizing the value of the coercion test:
[We may thus vindicate the abstract principle of due process, but we do
not shape the conduct of local police one whit; unpredictable reversals on
dissimilar fact situations are not likely to curb the zeal of those police
and prosecutors who may be intent on racking up a high percentage of
successful prosecutions.
Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 138 (1954). For a general discussion of the weaknesses of the coerced confession doctrine, see Yate Kamisar, 4 Dissent from Miranda
Dissents: Some Comments on the "New" Fifth Amendment and the Old Voluntariness"
test, 65 MICH. L. REV. 59, 94-104 (1966).
21. U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall...
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence). Given the multitude of factors that
could be applied to a confession under the voluntariness approach of Brown and its
progeny, the focus of the Court's attention began to shift from the circumstances of
the confession to the question of whether a defendant had the protection of counsel
during interrogation. In Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958), the Court held
that continued questioning of a defendant after he had requested to speak with his
attorney violated the Sixth Amendment and barred the use of a confession thus obtained, regardless of whether it was voluntarily given. In Spano v. New York, the
right to counsel and its attendant protections were held to begin when a defendant
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court in its 1964 decision in Escobedo v. Illinois22 held that a
suspect not only had a right to consult with an attorney during
pre-indictment questioning, but also the absolute right to remain silent until he could do so.' This decision, handed down
only a week after the Court officially applied the Fifth Amendment to the states in Mallory v. Hogan,' paved the way for
extension of Fifth Amendment safeguards beyond the courtroom
and the creation of the modern rule of Miranda v. Arizona,
with its now-famous "concrete constitutional guidelines for law
enforcement agencies."26 With Miranda, the Court established
a strict Fifth Amendment exclusionary rule whereby a suspect
must be warned prior to questioning that he has the right to
remain silent, that any statement he makes can be used as
evidence against him, and that he has the right to an attorney
of his own choosing or appointed by the state." A confession
obtained prior to
such warning is presumptively coerced and ex28
cluded at trial.
B. The Fourth Amendment
Evolution of CollateralAttack

Exclusionary Rule

and the

In contrast to the shifting constitutional background of the
Miranda safeguards, the exclusion of unlawfully obtained physical evidence found its statutory foundation in both the Fourth
was formally charged with a crime. 360 U.S. 315 (1959). In Escobedo v. Illinois, these
protections were extended even to a suspect who has become the focus of a criminal
investigation. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
22. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
23. Id. at 490-91. Though limiting its holding to the facts of that case, the majority
declared:
[Wihere, as here, the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an
unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect ... and
the police have not effectively warned him of his absolute constitutional
right to remain silent . . . no statement elicited by the police during the
interrogation may be used against him at a criminal trial.
Id. (emphasis added).
24. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
25. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
26. Id. at 442.
27. Id. at 444.
28. The Miranda warnings, the Court said, are "prerequisites to the admissibility of
any statement made by a defendant. . . . The privilege against self-incrimination
protects the individual from being compelled to incriminate himself in any manner . . . ." Id. at 476.
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and Fifth Amendments from an early point in its evolution. As
early as 1886, in Boyd v. United States,29 the Supreme Court
held that the freedom from unlawful searches and seizures and
the privilege against self-incrimination were so closely related
that they ran "almost into each other."" Moreover, the doctrines of those rights, the Court said, "apply to all invasions on
the part of the government and its employees of the sanctity of
a man's home and the privacies of life."31 Less than thirty
years after Boyd, the Court extended this reasoning in Weeks v.
United States32 to hold that, in federal prosecutions, the
Fourth Amendment barred the use of evidence obtained in
violation of the search and seizure clause.3"
However, as it had with regard to the exclusion of coerced
testimony, the Court's rationale for excluding unlawfully
obtained evidence grew to encompass concerns other than
protection of a defendant's specific constitutional rights. For
instance, in Wolf v. Colorado,4 the Court recognized the
fundamental nature of a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights
and announced that the "security of one's private property
against arbitrary intrusion by the police... is ... implicit in
the 'concept of ordered liberty' and as such is enforceable
against the States." 5 Nevertheless, the Court balanced the
Fourth Amendment's safeguards against other concerns and
declined to impose Weeks upon the states. This decision,
according to the Court, was largely made for "factual" reasons,
including the opposition of a substantial number of the states
to the Weeks doctrine,36 and the Court's deference to the states
in choosing a means for enforcement of Fourth Amendment rights.37

29. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).

30. Id. at 630.
31. Id.
32. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).

33. Id. at 391-92; Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949) (explaining the Weeks
decision).

34. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
35. Id. at 27 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
36. "As of today," the Court emphasized, "30 States reject the Weeks doctrine, 17
States are in agreement with it ....
Of 10 jurisdictions within the United Kingdom
and the British Commonwealth of Nations which have passed on the question, none
has held the evidence obtained by illegal search and seizure inadmissible ....
" Wolf,
338 U.S. at 29-30.
37. [lit is not for this Court to condemn as falling below the minimal stan-
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Twelve years later, in 1961, the Court overruled Wolf in
Mapp v. Ohio,"5 specifically applying the exclusionary rule to
the states and excluding evidence at trial which was seized in
violation of the Fourth Amendment.39 The basis for this decision was the recognition of the universal nature of Fourth
Amendment protections,40 and the conclusion that the Wolf
rule, if continued, would make those protections a "'form of
words,' valueless and undeserving of mention in a perpetual
charter of inestimable human liberties."4 ' Moreover, far from
decrying the principles of federalism and comity espoused by
Wolf in deciding not to infringe upon state enforcement of the
Fourth Amendment, the Mapp Court embraced these as valid
considerations.42 Seizing upon the fact that, under Wolf, a federal prosecutor may make no use of illegally obtained evidence,
but may turn the same evidence over for use by a State's attorney "across the street," the Court held that "judicial integrity"

dards assured by the Due Process Clause a State's reliance upon other
methods which, if consistently enforced, would be equally effective ....
There are, moreover, reasons for excluding evidence unreasonably obtained by the federal police which are less compelling in the case of police under state or local authority. The public opinion of a community
can far more effectively be exerted against oppressive conduct on the part
of police directly responsible to the community itself than can local opinion, sporadically aroused, be brought to bear upon remote authority pervasively exerted throughout the country.
Id. at 31-32.
38. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
39. Id. at 655.
40. "Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable
against the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them by the same sanction of exclusion as is used against the Federal
Government." Id. at 655.
41. Id. Recognizing the precarious protection afforded by entrusting enforcement to
state and local officials, the Court held the Amendment applicable to states in the
same manner and to the same degree as it applied to the federal government. "To
hold otherwise is to grant the right but in reality withhold its privilege and enjoyment." Id. at 656.
42. The Court noted that while "prior to the Wolf case, almost two-thirds of the
States were opposed to the exclusionary rule, now, despite Wolf, more than half of
those since passing upon it, by their own legislative or judicial decision, have wholly
or partly adopted or adhered to the Weeks rule." Id. at 651. Furthermore, the Court
noted that the experience of California, one of the most significant followers of the
rule, had shown that "other means of protection" of Fourth Amendment rights were
"worthiess and futile," a conclusion "buttressed by the experience of other States." Id.
at 651-52.
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demanded universal application of the exclusionary rule to both
federal and state governments.' "Nothing can destroy a government more quickly," the Court warned, "than its failure to
observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of
its own existence."" In Stone v. Powell,45 however, the Court
decided that the limitations of this reasoning were reached
upon collateral review of a conviction based on illegally seized
evidence. In such a situation, the Court held that the countervailing considerations' of comity,47 judicial integrity,48 and
the "costs"49 in terms of judicial resources of such relief,
though justifying enforcement of the exclusionary rule at trial
or on appeal, counselled against its enforcement by writ of
habeas corpus unless a defendant was denied a full and fair
opportunity to litigate the matter earlier.0 Until Withrow, the
question remained whether similar constraints would be applied
to federal habeas relief for Miranda violations.

HI. CONSENT, COERCION OR COOPERATION-THE FACTS OF
WITHROW V. WILLIAMS

Pursuant to the investigation of a shooting and double murder, two Michigan police officers called upon respondent Williams at his residence and asked him to come down to the
police station for questioning. Williams agreed to go, and was
searched and escorted to the police station unrestrained. One
officer testified that Williams was not under arrest at this time,
but a contemporaneous police report states that Williams was
arrested at his residence. Once at the station, the officers decided not to advise Williams of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, and, after Williams repeatedly denied any knowledge of or
connection to the murder, one officer threatened to charge him
and "lock [him] up." Williams then began to implicate himself,
but the officers, assuring him that their only concern was the
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at 660.
Id.
428 U.S. 465 (1976).
Id. at 466.
Id. at 478.
Id. at 484.
Id. at 489.
Id. at 488-95.
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identity of the "shooter," continued questioning without
Mirandizing him. Williams admitted that he had furnished the
murder weapon to the killer, but claimed he had not been present at the scene of the crime. At this point, some 40 minutes
after the beginning of questioning, the officers advised Williams
of his Miranda rights. Williams waived his rights, and made
several more inculpatory statements, including admissions that,
in fact, he had: 1) been present at the scene of the murders; 2)
driven the killer to and from the scene; 3) witnessed the killings; and 4) helped the killer dispose of incriminating evidence.
The officers interrogated Williams again on two other occasions
before the state formally charged him with murder.5 '
At trial, the court declined to suppress Williams' statements
on the ground that he had been given timely Miranda warnings. He was convicted of first degree murder and related
crimes. After the decision was affirmed by the Michigan Court
of Appeals and Williams was denied leave to appeal by the
Michigan Supreme Court, he filed a writ of habeas corpus in
the district court, alleging violations of his Miranda rights as
the principal basis for relief. The district court granted the
writ, finding that all statements made between the sergeant's
threat of incarceration and the reading of Williams rights
should have been suppressed. Without conducting further evidentiary proceedings or hearing arguments, the district court
also concluded that the statements Williams made after being
Mirandized should have been suppressed as involuntary under
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.52 The
court of appeals agreed on both points and affirmed, summarily
rejecting the argument that the rule in Stone v. Powell5
should apply to bar habeas review of a Miranda claim.54 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1992, and affirmed in part,
reversed in part, and remanded. With respect to the
voluntariness of Williams' post-Miranda statements, a unanimous Court reversed, holding that this issue was not raised on
habeas and that the state was manifestly prejudiced by the
district court's failure to afford an opportunity to present

51.
52.
53.
54.

Withrow v. Williams, 113 S. Ct. 1745, 1745-48 (1993).
Id. at 1748-49.
See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
Withrow, 113 S. Ct. at 1749.
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evidence on that claim.55 However, in remanding the case for
further proceedings on this question, the Court affirmed the
court of appeals' decision that Stone did not bar habeas review
of Williams' Miranda claim.56 Using the same "prudential" considerations it marshalled to deny habeas relief for violations of
the exclusionary rule, the Court held that principles of comity,
federalism and judicial integrity do not limit use of the writ for
Miranda violations.57
IV. WITHROW'S INITIAL BALANCE-WEIGHING THE NATURE OF
MIRANDA AND THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE

A. Stone v.
Limitation?

Powell:

Jurisdictional Bar

Prudential

or

Laying the groundwork to distinguish Stone v. Powell, the
Withrow Court begins its analysis by emphasizing that Stone's
limitation on federal habeas relief was not jurisdictional in
nature, but rather a self-imposed prudential constraint limiting
habeas review where the state has provided an opportunity for
full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim.5" Still,
this non-jurisdictional portrayal of'Stone is not a universally
accepted one. As Justices Brennan and Marshall argue in their
dissent, the majority's decision in Stone involves not so much

55. Id. at 1755. This point, the Court said, "should keep us only briefly." Id. Since
Williams had raised only one claim going to the admissibility of his statements to the
police, that the police elicited those statements without satisfying the Miranda requirements, and since petitioner's answer addressed only that claim, the Court held
that Williams had effectively conceded the voluntariness of statements made after
being Mirandized. Therefore, the Court rejected Williams' claim that this issue had
been tried by implied consent of the parties under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
15(b) and held that it was error for the district court to reach the question of whether or not these statements were made voluntarily. Id. at 1755-56.
56. Id. at 1746.
57. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 466 (1976).
58. Withrow, 113 S. Ct. at 1750. Writing for the majority, Justice Souter states:
"[w]e have made it clear that Stone's limitation on federal habeas relief was not
jurisdictional in nature,

but rested on prudential

concerns ...

."

Id.

See also

Kuhlman v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 447 (1986) (discussing equitable principles underlying Stone v. Powell); Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 (1986); Allen v. McCurry,
449 U.S. 90 (1980) (stating that Stone concerns "the prudent exercise of federal-court
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2254"); cf 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (stating that a court entertaining a habeas petition shall "dispose of the matter as law and justice require").
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the right of a defendant to have unlawfully-seized evidence
excluded as it does "the availability of a federal forum for vindicating those federally guaranteed [Fourth Amendment]
rights."59 Moreover, regardless of the characterization of the
decision, its effects are decidedly jurisdictional in nature."e
Justice Brennan, for one, argues that the effect of Stone on
habeas review of exclusionary rule violations "do[es] not fall far
short of abolishing this head of jurisdiction."6' Nevertheless,
for many of the reasons that the Stone Court foreclosed federal
habeas jurisdiction over the exclusionary rule, the Withrow
majority specifically protects such jurisdiction for Miranda violations. Its rationale for doing so involves what the Court perceives to be fundamental distinctions between the nature of
Miranda and exclusionary rule safeguards.
I

B. Miranda and the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule:
"FundamentalRights"?
According to the Court, a key distinction between the
Miranda and exclusionary rule protections is the nature of the
rights they protect. Unlike the exclusionary rule of Mapp v.
Ohio, the majority in Withrow contends that Miranda secures
"a fundamental trial right,"62 the Fifth Amendment's privilege
against self-incrimination. This argument, however, begs the
question: are the exclusionary and Miranda rules really distin59. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 503 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice
Brennan also argued that, in light of federal habeas statutes (28 U.S.C. § 2254),
Stone was incorrectly decided. He wrote that the equitable considerations advanced by
the Court were not sufficient "to allow this court to rewrite the jurisdictional statutes
enacted by Congress." Id. at 506.
60. As Justice White's dissent illustrates, the Court's decision in Stone makes possible a situation in which two defendants, convicted of identical crimes, on the basis
of evidence seized pursuant to identical exclusionary rule violations, could face radically different fates. If defendant A petitions for certiorari on the basis that his
Fourth Amendment rights have been violated, and if his petition is granted, the evidence against him may be excluded and he may go free. If defendant B, on the other
hand, does not petition for certiorari, or his petition is denied, and he seeks habeas
relief without claiming that he has been denied an opportunity for full and fair litigation of his claim, the writ will be denied, and he may spend the rest of his life in
jail. See Stone, 428 U.S. at 536 (White, J., dissenting).
61. Stone, 428 U.S. at 529 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Brown v. Allen, 344
U.S. 443, 498-99 (1953)) (emphasis added).
62. Withrow, 113 S. Ct. at 1753 (quoting United States v. Verdugo-Uriquidez, 494
U.S. 259, 264 (1990)); cf Kiimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 377 (1986).
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guishable on this basis? In formulating the exclusionary rule,
the Mapp Court specifically based its decision on the fundamental nature of Fourth Amendment rights."3 Extending the rule

from federal to state criminal convictions, the Court buttressed
its reasoning by arguing that both the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments compel the exclusion of unlawfully obtained evidence at trial." At various times, the Court has recognized
that, while neither Miranda nor the exclusionary rule are themselves constitutionally mandated, both are necessary to effectuate fundamental Fourth and Fifth Amendment liberties. 5 Given this line of precedent, the proffered difference between the
Miranda and exclusionary rule safeguards revolves, not around

their constitutional underpinnings, but rather their effect on the
operation of the criminal justice system. Are these grounds
alone sufficient to distinguish between the two?
Miranda,the Withrow majority argues, "facilitates the correct
ascertainment of guilt by guarding against the use of unreliable
statements at trial."' With this line of reasoning, the Court

63. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 649 (1961) (quoting McNabb v. United States, 318
U.S. 332, 339-40 (1943) ("A conviction in the federal courts, the foundation of which
is evidence obtained in disregard of liberties deemed fundamental by the Constitution,
cannot stand.")).
64. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886). In addition, the majority emphasized the interconnected nature of the Fourth and the other Bill of Rights Amendments by remarking:
Indeed, ve are aware of no restraint, similar to that rejected today, conditioning the enforcement of any other basic Constitutional right. The
right to privacy, no less important than any other right carefully and
particularly reserved to the people, would (otherwise) stand in marked
contrast to all other rights declared as "basic to a free society."
Id. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 656 (citing Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949)) (emphasis
added).
65. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966) (arguing that Miranda's procedural safeguards were not themselves rights protected by the Constitution, but instead were measures to ensure that the right against compulsory self-incrimination
was protected); Mapp, 367 U.S. at 649 (holding that the exclusionary rule was a
constitutionally required, if judicially implied, safeguard without which the Fourth
Amendment would be reduced to "a form of words"); cf. Duckworth v. Eagan, 492
U.S. 195, 203 (1989); Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 528 (1987); New York v.
Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974);
McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 339-40 (1943); Olmstead v. United States,
277 U.S. 438, 462 (1928); Bryars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 29-30 (1927).
66. Withrow, 113 S. Ct. at 1747. Elaborating on this principle the Court says: -[A]
system of criminal law enforcement which comes to depend on the "confession" will,
in the long run, be less reliable and more subject to abuses than a system relying on
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alludes to language in several prior opinions which held that
the inherently coercive nature of custodial interrogation throws
doubt on the reliability of testimony so obtained. 7 Though
both Miranda and the exclusionary rule serve to deter future
unlawful police conduct,6" the Court concluded that the exclusion of non-testimonial evidence "can do nothing to remedy the
completed and wholly extrajudicial Fourth Amendment violation."6 9 Here again, these justifications are inconsistent with
prior opinions. For instance, although the "reliability of evidence" argument finds support in Stone,7" it expressly contradicts the rationale behind Mapp, which held that insufficient
empirical evidence was available to conclude that the
exclusionary rule fetters law enforcement. 7 More importantly,
the Mapp majority decided that the exclusionary rule must be
applied, irrespective of law enforcement concerns, in order to
safeguard a defendant's fundamental privacy rights.7 2 In fact,
the reliability of unconstitutionally seized evidence is controverted by the facts of Mapp. There, a defendant was convicted,
on the basis of evidence obtained in an unlawful search of her
home, of possessing pornographic materials which may not have
been hers and of which she may have had no knowledge. 3
The Court's remedy rationale is similarly contradictory. In
either a Miranda or Mapp situation, a violation of constitution-

independent investigation." Id. at 1753 (quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433,
448 n.23.).
67. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 479 (1976) (indicating that Fifth Amendment
violations are different in kind from violations of similar Bill of Rights protections in
that they "impugn the integrity of the fact-finding process" and produce evidence
which is "inherently unreliable"); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 439-42 (1966)
(discussing police interrogation practices and their tendency to elicit false admissions);
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478,-488-89 (1964) (arguing Miranda serves to guard
against the use of unreliable statements at trial); cf Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545,
559 (1979) (indicating that the rule in Stone goes to the integrity of the judicial process itself and, thus, claims of grand jury discrimination are not cognizable on habeas
after Stone).
68. Stone, 428 U.S. at 486 ("The primary justification for the exclusionary rule then
is deterrence of police conduct that violates Fourth Amendment rights.").
69. Withrow, 113 S. Ct. at 1753 (quoting Stone, 428 U.S. at 486).
70. Stone, 428 U.S. at 497.
71. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
72. Id. at 661. In fact, the Court in Mapp insisted that to hold otherwise would be
to render the Fourth Amendment meaningless and merely "a form of words." Id. at
655.
73. See id. at 643-46.
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al rights has occurred, the unlawful coercion of testimony or the
unlawful seizure of other evidence. In neither case does the
exclusion of such evidence address the violation itself; it merely
prevents further injury through its use at trial. '4 Nor is a distinction apparent when the Miranda and Mapp rules are enforced via appeal or by writ of habeas corpus. In both situations, relief does nothing to withdraw the initial breach of a
defendant's Fourth or Fifth Amendment privileges. A reversal
or writ of habeas corpus provides no redress for the injury
itself, it merely interdicts the consequences of incarceration.
However, as the Withrow decision makes clear, the fact that
neither Miranda nor the exclusionary rule directly address a
constitutional violation, justifies considering other factors in
deciding if habeas relief is proper. According to the Court, these
"prudential" concerns constitute the most important distinction
between the Miranda and exclusionary rules.
V. WITHROW'S FINAL BALANCE: THE COSTS OF MIRANDA AND
THE ExCLusIoNARY RULE-EQUITABLE CONCERNS, INEQUITABLE
RESULTS?
In Stone v. Powell, a 6-3 majority held that, where evidence
has been obtained by an unlawful search and seizure, the Constitution "require[d] exclusion of such evidence at trial and
reversal of conviction upon direct review."75 However, given the
societal costs involved, and in light of the "purpose of the
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule," the court held that habeas relief for such a conviction was not similarly justified.7'
In Withrow, the Court defines these costs in terms of "the public interest in: 1) the effective utilization of limited judicial
resources; 2) the need for finality in criminal trials; 3) the
minimization of friction between our federal and state systems

74. As the majority stated in Mapp, the use of unconstitutionally obtained evidence
at trial itself involves "a denial of the constitutional rights of the accused." Id. at 648
(quoting Weeks v. U.S., 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914)). Also in Mapp, the Court emphasized that the exclusionary rule is an essential part, "logically and constitutionally
necessary" to the right of privacy. The court felt that to hold otherwise was to grant
such a right but preclude its enjoyment. Id. at 656.
75. Stone, 428 U.S. at 480 (citing Mapp, 376 U.S. at 643).
76. Id. at 481-82.
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of justice; and 4) the maintenance of the constitutional balance
upon which the doctrine of federalism is founded."77
A. Federalism Concerns
The Withrow Court holds that eliminating collateral review of
Miranda claims "would not significantly benefit the federal
courts in their exercise of habeas jurisdiction, or advance the
causes of federalism in any substantial way."78 According to
the Court, eliminating habeas review of Miranda issues would
not prevent a state prisoner from achieving the same results by
simply converting his barred Miranda claim into a due process
claim that his conviction rested on an involuntary confession. 7"
Therefore, the majority concludes that federal courts would not
hear the last of Miranda on collateral review. In deciding
voluntariness under the "totality of the circumstances approach," a court could consider the failure by police to advise a
defendant of his rights to remain silent and to have counsel
present during questioning." Although admitting to a lack of
empirical evidence for the proposition, the Court further assumes that "virtually all Miranda claims would be recast in
this way"8 ' and that, in any case, each Miranda claim presents
an independent legal question requiring "independent federal
determination."82 As a result, the Court concludes that collateral review of Miranda does not extend, but is merely an alternative to, existing federal jurisdiction in this area.83 Ironically,
for much the same reasons, the Court in Stone concluded that
collateral review of exclusionary rule claims would offend principles of federalism. There, the fact that a defendant could find
other Fourteenth Amendment due process grounds for relief
counselled against preserving this avenue of jurisprudence.'
In addition, since the exclusionary rule is a court-created entity,
the Stone Court decided that collateral review of state court

77. Withrow, 113 S. Ct. at 1750.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 1754.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 112 (1985)).
Id.
Stone, 428 U.S. at 481-85.
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decisions would cause unnecessary friction between federal and
state courts." The Withrow Court, however, finds that comity
concerns are not compelling in the collateral review of Miranda
violations.
B. Comity and Friction
In Stone, the majority concluded that indiscriminate federal
enforcement of the exclusionary rule would generate "disrespect
for the law and the administration of justice."86 Furthermore,
given the other avenues for review of Fourth Amendment
claims, the Court ruled that supervision of state courts would
be little served by habeas review of such claims. The perceived
need for collateral review of this area of law, the Court continued, stemmed from a mistaken belief in the deterrent effect of
habeas cases upon law enforcement officials, and a mistrust of
state courts as fair and competent forums for the adjudication
of constitutional rights." For these reasons, the intergovernmental friction engendered by collateral review outweighed any
benefit it might confer." On the other hand, in Withrow, these
same considerations supported maintaining collateral review of
Miranda claims.
"We fail to see," the Withrow Court states, "how purporting
to eliminate Miranda issues from federal habeas would go very
far to relieve such tensions as Miranda may now raise between
the two judicial systems."89 Though the majority recognizes the
potential for friction when a federal court overturns a state
conviction, it also decides that "[iut is not reasonable ... to
expect such occurrences to be frequent enough to ...

raise

federal-state tensions to an appreciable degree."" In fact, while
admitting that the requirements and meaning of Miranda were

85. Id.
86. Id. at 491.
87. Id. at 493-94.
88. Id.
89. Withrow, 113 S. Ct. at 1754.
90. Id. at 1755. Along a similar line of reasoning, the majority also argues that,
given the expanse of time since the decision in Miranda, law enforcement has grown
in constitutional and technological sophistication and there is little reason to believe
that state law enforcement officials are unable or unwilling to fulfill Miranda's requirements. Id.
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respected by the states, the Court holds that continued collateral review is needed to maintain such respect and respond to
"the occasional abuse that the federal writ of habeas corpus
stands ready to correct."9 ' This same intolerance for even an
"occasional" violation of Miranda is espoused by the Court in
evaluating the effect of the Miranda and exclusionary rules
upon judicial integrity and judicial finality.
C. Finality and JudicialResources
As Justices O'Connor and Rehnquist observe, collateral attacks raise numerous concerns not present upon direct review.
Among the most profound is their effect upon the finality of
criminal convictions. 2 In Stone, the argument was made that
by maintaining extraneous avenues of appeal, collateral review
of Fourth Amendment claims undercuts the finality of convictions while providing little benefit to the system and exacting
enormous cost.93 Conversely, in Withrow the majority concludes
that since collateral attack of Miranda violations creates no
additional opportunity for review and imposes no new burden
on the system, it consumes few additional resources." In response to claims that its decision undermines finality, the Court
defines the term finality not on a case-by-case basis, but in a
systemic fashion. The majority proposes that "a system of criminal law enforcement which comes to depend on the [coerced]
'confession' will, in the long run be less reliable and more subject to abuses than a system relying on independent investigation."95 In this manner, the Court also exposes what may be

91. Id. (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 322 (1979)).
92. Id. at 1756. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). As Justice O'Connor remarks: "it goes
without saying that, at some point, judicial proceedings must draw to a close and
that the matter be deemed conclusively resolved; no society can afford forever to
question the correctness of its every judgment . . . . '[tihe writ, however, strikes at
finality.'" (quoting McClesky v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. 1454, 1468 (1991)).
93. Id.
94. As the Court points out, "eliminating habeas review of Miranda issues would
not prevent a state prisoner from simply converting his barred Miranda claim into a
due process claim that his conviction rested on an involuntary confession." Withrow,
113 S. Ct. at 1754. "We could lock the front door against Miranda," the Court says,
"but not the back." Id.
95. Id. at 1753 (citing Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1966)).
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the only way to reconcile these two decisions, a change in perspective.
To illustrate, in Stone v. Powell the Court approached the
exclusionary rule with the assumption that habeas jurisdiction
was unnecessary unless it could be shown to provide some
additional utility not offered by other avenues of review.96 In
Withrow, however, the Court assumes that a defendant is entitled to collateral review of a Miranda claim, unless compelling
reasons to deny relief can be found.97 To the extent that the
distinction between Withrow and Stone rests on differences in
the Court's approach in each case, the future of habeas jurisprudence remains uncertain.
VI.

THE

DIFFERENCE

BETWEEN

MIRANDA

AND

THE

EXCLUSIONARY RULE: THE LAW AFTER WITHROW V. WILLIAMS
In short, with its decision in Withrow, the Supreme Court
reveals less of a substantive difference between the Miranda
and exclusionary rules than it does a change in its methodology
of analysis regarding collateral review of those rules. In Stone,
the majority asked whether the merits of continued habeas
jurisdiction warrant its cost in terms of judicial resources, federal-state friction, and the effectiveness of law enforcement. In
Withrow, however, the majority asks whether eliminating habeas would achieve sufficient savings, in terms of these same
costs, to justify depriving a defendant of this avenue of redress.
The prudential concerns identified in Stone, therefore, are not
perceived in Withrow, primarily because the applicable test was
changed. It is submitted that this change in evaluation constitutes the sole defensible distinction between Miranda and
exclusionary rule safeguards. As discussed above, neither the
nature, function, nor prudential characteristics of Miranda or
the exclusionary rule provide a clear and satisfying basis upon
which to explain such differential treatment.

96. See Stone, 428 U.S. at 478 n.11. For example, note the Court's assertion that
habeas review of exclusionary rule violations "will not be allowed to do service for an
appeal." Id. at 477 n.10 (quoting Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174, 178 (1947)).
97. This is in part based on the Court's conclusion that review in Miranda claims
is inevitable in one form or another. Withrow, 113 S. Ct. at 1754.
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What, then, is the future of collateral review in these areas?
The Court seems undecided. While preserving habeas jurisdiction over Miranda violations in Withrow, it nonetheless reins in
what it deems an overzealous enforcement of the rule." Moreover, in a case handed down on the same day as Withrow, the
Court restricted collateral review of Miranda, holding that
where a defendant's silence was used as evidence against him
at trial, habeas relief is available only if he can show that such
"evidence" had a substantial injurious effect upon the verdict.99
This decision is representative of a line of cases which have
slowly carved exceptions into what was originally conceived as
the absolute or prophylactic nature of the Miranda rule. °0 To
the extent that such exceptions continue to be recognized and,
as the distance between the nature and enforcement of
Miranda and the exclusionary rule narrows, the differential
treatment of the two on petition for habeas may in fact offend
the principles of federalism and finality espoused by the Court.
For these reasons, it appears that the perceived distinction between Miranda and exclusionary rule safeguards will be problematic. A more advisable, and perhaps inevitable course, would
be to treat these rules identically on habeas, moderating their
"societal costs" through exceptions to review, perhaps for public
exigency or good faith adherence to their precepts.'0 '
Whatever the case, the current rule of Withrow v. Williams
offers equitable concerns to justify an arguably inequitable
result, and one that may burden the Court in decisions to
come.
John K. Byrum, Jr.
98. Withrow, 113 S. Ct. at 1755 (holding that the defendant's post-Miranda statements were not at issue and should not have been considered by the Court of Appeals).
99. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710 (1993).
100. Since the Court's decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 486 (1966), numerous exceptions to the exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of the rule have been
recognized. For instance, where such failure to advise a defendant of his Miranda
rights is necessitated by "public exigency," New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654
(1984), or where evidence is used to impeach the credibility of a witness, Harris v.
New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224-26 (1971).
101. For example, such an exemption is provided for exclusionary rule violations. See
Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983).

